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TULSA LAW JOURNAL
anticipated conduct, serves the interests of society in general
and the individual specifically."
Joseph Van Wairaven
TORTS: RECOVERY FOR PRENATAL INJURY AND
THE WRONGFUL DEATH OF A STILLBORN FETUS
This artick will consider the cause of action for the
wrongful death of a stillborn fetus. In order to place this
problem in its proper perspective, it is first necessary to un-
derstand the common law right of recovery for prenatal in-
jury in cases where the injury inflicted by the wrongdoer is
not severe enough to cause death of the fetus.
i.
HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE RIGHT OF
ACTION FOR PRENATAL INJURIES AT COMMON LAW
Although all jurisdictions have not directly passed on the
question, it is generally accepted as the modern majority posi-
tion that there is a right of action on common law principles
for tortiously inflicted prenatal injuries. This, however, has
not always been the majority position and is in fact a rela-
tively recent development.'
The first American case to consider the possibility of re-
covery for prenatal injury was Dietrich v. Inhabitants of
418 Id. at 133; in Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959),
the Court declared that "under our system suspicion is not
enough for an officer to lay hands on a citizen. It is far
better, so the Fourth Amendment teaches, that the guilty
sometimes go free than that citizens be subject to easy ar-
rest". 361 U.S. at 104.
1 For more detailed historical treatment of the subject see
White, The Right of Recovery for Prenatal Injuries, 12 LA.
L. REv. 383 (1952) and Gordon, The Unborn Plaintiff, 63
MIcH. L. REv. 579 (1965).
[Vol. 8, No. I
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Northampton. 2 The main thrust of Justice Holmes' opinion
was that the injured fetus which died upon birth or shortly
thereafter was an inextricable part of the mother and any
injury suffered by it could be recovered by the mother in an
action on her own behalf.
But no case, so far as we know, has ever decided
that, if the infant survived, it could maintain an ac-
tion for injuries received by it while in its mother's
womb. ... Taking all the foregoing considerations in-
to account, and further, that, as the unborn child was
a part of the mother at the time of the injury, any
damage to it which was not too remote to be recovered
for at all was recoverable by her .... 
The Dietrich case was clearly not a perfect one in which
to establish common law precedent allowing recovery for
prenatal injuries. The child was not viable, there was no di-
rect communication of the injury to the child, there is doubt
whether the child experienced an extrauterine life, and the
injury to the mother in the fourth or fifth month of preg-
nancy was communicated to the fetus without any clear
chance for the wrongdoer to be aware of the existence of the
fetus. A review of the cases considering this problem evi-
dences an early reluctance on the part of common law courts
to delve into the unknown world of the fetus, an area clearly
within the province of medical experts. Additionally, it should
be noted, while the Dietrich court cited the lack of precedent
in denying the cause of action, later courts were not reluctant
to cite Dietrich as authority for denying the cause of action,
factual distinctions notwithstanding.4
2 138 Mass. 14 (1884).
8 138 Mass. at 15, 17.
4 E.g., Allaire v. St. Luke's Hospital, 184 Ill. 359, 56 N.E. 638
(1900). Justice Holmes cited the lack of duty to the infant
in the Dietrich opinion; the Allaire opinion cited Dietrich
as authority for denying the action, but the action was
against a hospital to which the pregnant woman had gone
for prenatal care.
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Despite persuasive dissents,5 some civil law decisions al-
lowing the action,6 and actions based on specific statutes,7 not
until 1949 did a decision of a court of last resort approve a
cause of action for prenatal injury based on common law de-
cisions alone.8
Williams v. Marion Rapid Transit, Inc." involved an ac-
tion for prenatal injuries brought by a surviving child, and
Verkennes v. Corniea ° involved the" state wrongful death
statute" because the infant was stillborn. This difference is
considered by some to be material on the ground that policy
considerations are much stronger for allowing recovery to
the living child whose mind or body is impaired by a prenatal
injury than for allowing a cause of action to the statutory
beneficiaries under a wrongful death statute in the event the
infant is born dead.1 2
The forensic medical view followed by the court in
Dietrich1 3 has been altered in the light of advancing medical
technology, and in 1960 the court which 76 years earlier had
set the American precedent denying a cause of action for
prenatal injuries reconsidered its holding in light of such
advances.
5 E.g., Justice Boggs' dissent in Allaire v. St. Luke's Hospital,
56 N.E. at 640 (1900).
6 Cooper v. Blanck, 39 So.2d 352 (La. App. 1923).
7 Scott v. McPheeters, 33 Cal. App. 2d 629, 92 P.2d 678 (1939).
8 Williams v. Marion Rapid Transit, Inc., 152 Ohio St. 114,
87 N.E.2d 334 (1949); Verkennes v. Corniea, 229 Minn. 365,
38 N.W.2d 838 (1949).
) 152 Ohio St. 114, 87 N.E.2d 334 (1949).
10 229 Minn. 365, 38 N.W.2d 838 (1949).
11 Mnu. STAT. ANN. §573.02 (Supp. 1971).
12 E.g., Drabbels v. Skelly Oil Co., 155 Neb. 17, 50 N.W.2d 229
(1951); In re Logan's Estate, 4 Misc. 2d 283, 156 N.Y.S.2d
49 (1956). This policy argument was considered in Stidam
v. Ashmore, 109 Ohio App. 431, 167 N.E.2d 106 (1959) up-
on a broad state constitutional declaration of policy af-
fording a remedy for every wrong.
13 138 Mass. 14 (1884).
[Vol. 8, No. I
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We think it advisable that in respect to the subject
of prenatal injury the law of this Commonwealth
should be in general in harmony with that of the large
and growing proportion of the other States.... There
is no need to reverse the Dietrich decision which
doubtless was right when rendered but we recognize
that in view of modern precedent its application
should be limited to cases where the facts are essen-
tially the same.14
With the assistance of advanced medical technology, mod-
ern courts have generally overcome their fears of the un-
known world of the fetus and have allowed the infant plain-
tiff to bring an action in its own behalf for prenatal injuries.
Dean Prosser characterized the remnants of the older rule
denying the action as "... decisions not yet overruled."15
11.
THE HISTORY AND NATURE OF THE WRONGFUL
DEATH ACTION
Unlike the common law action for prenatal injury where
the injured fetus is born alive, a cause of action for wrong-
ful death is purely statutory.16 Although various reasons have
been given for denial of an action at common law for the
tortiously caused death of another,17 it appears the original
14 Keyes v. Construction Service, Inc., 340 Mass. 633, 165
N.E.2d 912, 915 (1960).
15 W. PRossER, HANDBOOK OF Tim LAw OF TORTS, §56, at 356
(3d ed. 1964) [hereinafter cited as PRossEI].
16 Note, Injuries to the Unborn-A Legal Medical Problem, W.
RES. L. REv. 499, 505 (1958); F. W. Woolworth Co. v. Todd,
204 Okla. 532, 231 P.2d 681 (1951).
17 E.g., Baker v. Bolton, 170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (K. B. 1808). Lord
Ellenborough stated in denying a husband's action for the
death of his wife, "[i]n a civil court, the death of a human
being [cannot] be complained of as an injury." It has al-
so been theorized that this concept grew from the fact
that the property of a "felonious" wrongdoer escheated to
the crown and this left no estate out of which to compen-
sate the survivors. T. PLucxNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF noH
19721
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reason is buried somewhere beneath a great mass of case law.
Some inroads were made on the concept that a cause of action
died with the person as early as the 11th century,18 but these
were primarily based on contract theories.10 The theory that
a tortiously inflicted personal injury which resulted in death
did not give rise to a cause of action was so deeply embedded
in the common law that Parliament finally remedied the situa-
tion with the Fatal Accidents Act of 1846,20 more popularly
cited as Lord Campbell's Act.
Regardless of the theory to be blamed for the lack of a
cause of action at common law for wrongfully caused death,
it is primarily of historical interest. At the present time every
jurisdiction in the common law system has made some pro-
vision either for the survival of a cause of action vested in
the deceased at his death or for an original cause of action
vested in specifically named individuals or the estate of the
deceased.2'
Although a comparative analysis of the various wrong-
ful death and survivor statutes is beyond the scope of this
article,22 some of the more common characteristics of these
acts should be noted to provide a basis of understanding for
the problems encountered in the courts by the survivor or
representative of the stillborn fetus.
Statutory remedies for tortiously inflicted death fall gen-
erally into two categories: either they preserve a cause of
CommoN LAw, 442 (5th ed. 1956). See also Shields v. Yonge,
15 Ga. 349 (1854). The evil wrong is absorbed in the of-
fense against the state.
18 T. PLUCKNETT, A CONcISE HISTORY OF THE COIm.nVoN LAW,
377 (5th ed. 1956).
19 Id. at 378.
20 Fatal Accidents Act of 1846, 9 & 10 Vict., c. 93.
21 PROSSER §§120, 121.
22 For a detailed history and analysis of wrongful death stat-
utes see Miller, Dead Men in Torts: Lord Campbell's Act
Was Not Enough, 19 CATH. UzNv. L. REv. 283 (1970).
[Vol. 8, No. I
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action vested in the deceased for his injuries at the instant
of death (survivor statutes) ,2 or they create a new cause of
action in a specified class of beneficiaries upon death (death
statutes) .24 Since the causes of action are creatures of statute
in all jurisdictions, they vary widely. However, in general,
the survivor statutes are aimed at preserving a cause of ac-
tion for injuries of the deceased, including pain and suffer-
ing, at the time of death, while death statutes are aimed at
compensating the beneficiaries, usually family or next of kin,
for the pecuniary loss they have occasioned by the death.25
In connection with the element of damages, many prob-
lems have grown out of litigation involving either type of
statute, especially those classified as death statutes. Since the
death statutes attempt to provide compensation for the death
in the amount of pecuniary benefit the survivor would have
received but for the death, there is an obvious element of
speculation.26 This speculation is sometimes said to be greater
when the decendent is a child of tender years.27
II.
WRONGFUL DEATH AND THE STILLBORN FETUS
In cases involving whether there is a cause of action by
virtue of a given death statute for death of a fetus caused by
prenatal injury, two general fact patterns are presented. In
both situations the injury to the fetus is inflicted while it is
en ventre sa mere. In the situation where the infant is born
alive but thereafter dies as a result of the prenatal injury,
absent a statutory prohibition to the contrary, the courts have
2 E.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, §1051 (1961).
24 E.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, §1053 (1961).
25 E.g., Muskogee Electric Traction Co. v. Hairel, 46 Okla.
409, 148 P. 1005 (1915).
28 Damages in wrongful death actions are not alone in in-
volving a degree of speculation. See Thomas, Medical
Prophecy and the Single Award: The Problem and a Pro-
posal, 1 TULSA L.J. 135 (1964).
27 See part III (3) infra.
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had little trouble in allowing the cause of action. The event
of birth is said to create a living person which the law will
recognize, thereby extending a right of action to a statutory
beneficiary for the death.28 In the other situation where the
fetus is injured en ventre sa mere and is born dead, the courts
have encountered more difficulty in rationalizing the result.29
The concept of tort law is very broad, and "it is intend-
ed to reconcile the policy of letting accidents lie where they
fall, and the reasonable freedom of others with the protec-
tion from injury."30 The system is relatively loose and imagina-
tive, and these characteristics have served the cause of jus-
tice well. The community tends to get the kind of tort law
it can afford "in dollars and cents."31 Some of the problems,
real or imaginary, that have been foreseen by the courts in
denying an action for the tortiously caused death of a still-
born fetus can be easily dealt with; others are not so easily
shoved aside.
As discussed earlier, the recognition of a cause of action
for tortiously inflicted prenatal injuries is a relatively new
concept in the common law. Many of the reasons given by
the former majority of jurisdictions in denying a cause of
action for such injuries have been more recently applied by
the slight minority32 of jurisdictions which have construed
wrongful death statutes as not applicable to the stillborn fetus.
28 E.g. Drabbels v. Skelly Oil Co., 155 Neb. 17, 50 N.W.2d 229,
232 (1951). (A child born dead never became a person
insofar as the law of torts is concerned.).
29 It is surprising the courts have had so much difficulty with
this fact circumstance. The Supreme Court of the United
States allowed recovery in 1893 for prenatal death of calves
when the cows were injured in a train accident. N.Y., Lake
Erie & W. R.R. v. Estill, 147 U.S. 591 (1893).
30 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAw 115 (Howe ed. 1963).
31 Miller, supra note 22, at 286.
32 Comment, Wrongful Death and the Stillborn Fetus-A Cur-
rent Analysis, 7 HOUSTON L. REV. 449, 450-53.
[Vol. 8, No. 1
7
Denton: Torts: Recovery for Prenatal Injury and the Wrongful Death of a S
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1972
PRENATAL INJURIES
(1) There is a lack of precedent for allowing the action.
To this contention, Justice Stone articulated the reply:
If we search the precedents so intent upon the past
that we have no eye for what is going on in the
world about us, it is easy to find analogies and resem-
blances which will serve as superficial justification
for the extension of a precedent to sets of facts whose
social implications may be quite different from any
which the precedents have considered.... If our ap-
praisals are mechanical and superficial, the law which
they generate will likewise be mechanical and super-
ficial, to become at last but a dry and sterile for-
malism.8 4
The novelty of an asserted right and the difficulty which
might be encountered in enforcing that right should not be
reasons for the denial of its existence. One of the primary
attributes of the common law system is the adaptability and
flexibility with which it meets the changing needs of the
times and society. 5 In the famous case of Woods v. Lancet"
the New York Court of Appeals in allowing an action for
prenatal injuries stated:
The sum of the argument against plaintiff here is
that there is no New York decision in which such a
claim has been enforced. . . We act in the finest
common-law tradition when we adapt and alter de-
cisional law to produce common-sense justice.
The same answer goes to the argument that the
change we here propose should come from the Legis-
lature, not the courts. Legislative action there could,
88 Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northampton, 138 Mass. 14 (1884).
34 Stone, The Common Law in the United States, 50 HARv.
L. REv. 4, 9-10 (1936).
31 "Its principles have been determined by the needs of so-
ciety and are ever susceptible to adaptation to new con-
ditions, relations, and usages, as the progress of civilization
may require." Russick v. Hicks, 85 F. Supp. 281, 286 (W. D.
Mich. 1949).
80 303 N.Y. 349, 102 N.E.2d 691 (1951).
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of course, be, but we abdicate our function, in a field
peculiarly nonstatutory, when we refuse to reconsider
an old and unsatisfactory court-made rule.3 7
(2) The unborn child is not a separate person to whom
a duty of care is owed under the law.88 Medical fact and rea-
son do not support this position. This rationale for denial of
an action was set forth as early as Dietrich.39 The Massachu-
setts court has since recognized the advancement of medical
science and altered its position accordingly.40 In his dissent
in Stemmer v. Kline:41 Justice Brogan set forth a summary of
the physiological facts concerning the fetus:
While it is a fact that there is a close dependence
by the unborn child on the organism of the mother, it
is not disputed today that the mother and the child
are two separate and distinct entities; that the unborn
child has its own system of circulation of the blood
separate and apart from the mother; that there is no
communication between the two circulation systems;
that the heart beat of the child is not in tune with
that of the mother but is more rapid; that there is
no dependence by the child on the mother except for
sustenance.
42
Indeed, the child is dependent on the mother for sustenance,
but most parents would testify to the fact that this dependence
does not end at birth; it continues for many years thereafter.
Duty is a concept in the law of torts which involves a
legally recognized standard of reasonable conduct owed by
an individual to the entire world.43 On the issue of duty, as
far as the concepts of time are involved, a factual alteration
37 Id. at 694.
38 White, The Right of Recovery for Prenatal Injuries, 12 LA.
L. REv. 383, 400 n.86 (1952).
39 138 Mass. 14 (1884).
40 Keyes v. Construction Service, Inc., 340 Mass. 633, 165 N.E.2d
912 (1960).
41 128 N.J.L. 455, 26 A.2d 489 (1942).
42 26 A.2d. at 687.
43 PROSSEM §53.
(Vol. 8, No. I
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of the now-famous McPherson v. Buick Motor Co.44 case would
give a shorthand illustration of the point. If the plaintiff in
the case had been a child of tender years who had not been
conceived before the defective automobile was sold to the
retailer, it is submitted the results would have been the
same by the application of a fiction of continuing negligence.
In fact there was but a single act of negligence, a single
violation of a standard of care to which all must answer, but
the violation resulted in the harm just the same. The Dietrich"
decision referred to the fact that the mother was only in the
fourth or fifth month of pregnancy, and the wrongdoer had
no chance to be aware of the fetus' existence. It is submitted
if a wrongdoer negligently crashed into a panel truck the
legal standard of care owed to the contents of the truck
would vary little whether it was loaded with china, children,
or pregnant cows.
46
(3) The child is a part of the mother, and any wrong
done to it will be remedied in a suit by her.47 This line of
reasoning is closely related to that in (2) above. The prob-
lem with this rationale is "[n]o decision has permitted a moth-
er's recovery for injury to that 'part of her' which was the
unborn child.' 48 Clearly there is an element of speculation in
every wrongful death action, and the younger (or for that
matter the more aged and infirm) the decedent, the greater
part the element of speculation plays. In this regard, it should
be noted that the concept of damages in wrongful death actions
is largely judicially created. A new measure of damages was
announced in Wycko v. Gnodtke49 which has been readily
44 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
45 138 Mass. 14 (1884).
46 See 0. HoLms, supra note 30.
47 Note, Torts: Possible Recoveries for Prenatal Injuries, 13
OKLA. L. REV. 92, 96 (1960).
48 Del Tufo, Recovery for Prenatal Torts: Actions for Wrong-
ful Death, 15 RuT. L. REV. 61, 67 (1960).
40 361 Mich. 331, 105 N.W.2d 118 (1960).
19721
10
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 8 [1972], Iss. 1, Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol8/iss1/5
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
accepted by some writers on the subject,5 0 and has a great
deal of common-sense appeal. In considering an appeal on the
issue of damages for the wrongful death of a 14-year-old child
the court first noted there was no statute which required the
measure of damages previously adopted.5 1 Then, in comment-
ing on the earlier rule5 2 the court stated:
The rulings reflect the philosophy of the times, its
ideals and its social conditions. It was the generation
of the debtor's prisons, of some 200 or more capital
offenses, and of the public flogging of women. It was
an era when ample work could be found for the agile
bodies and nimble fingers of small children....
This, then, was the day... when employment of
children of tender years was the accepted practice and
their pecuniary contributions to the family both sub-
stantial and provable. (footnote omitted).53
The court then announced a new criterion for determining
the economic detriment suffered by the survivors due to the
wrongful death of a family member.
Just as with respect to a manufacturing plant, or
industrial machine, value involves the costs of acquisi-
tion, emplacement, upkeep, maintenance service, re-
pairs, and renovation, so, in our context, we must con-
sider the expenses of birth, of food, of clothing, of
medicines, of instruction, of nurture and shelter.
Moreover, just as an item of machinery forming part
of a functioning industrial plant has a value over and
above that of a similar item in a showroom, awaiting
purchase, so an individual member of a family has a
value to others as part of a functioning social and
economic unit. The value is the value of mutual so-
ciety and protection, in a word, companionship. (foot-
notes omitted) .4
5o PROSSER §121.
51 105 N.W.2d at 120-21.
52 The so-called "economic benefit" rule.
W 105 N.W.2d at 120-21.
54 Id. at 122.
[Vol. 8, No. I
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In conclusion the court stated:
The fiction now employed as the measure of pe-
cuniary loss should be abandoned. It perpetuates an
attitude toward the value of a child's life completely
repudiated by modern legislation and the enlightened
child-welfare policies of this jurisdiction. It does vio-
lence to the intent of the act, which is to grant a re-
covery whenever a death 'of a person' is caused by
the wrongful act of another. 5
The Michigan court announced a measure of damages
more in keeping with the times by allowing some recovery for
the social value of a human life. It is a generally accepted fact
that a child is an economic burden rather than an economic
benefit, but it would appear the policy and social interest in
compensating the family for its loss of a member should be
considered along with the purely economic loss. It is suspect-
ed that such factors have been considered by courts and juries
alike, and a realistic measure of damages as announced by
the Michigan court would spare both courts and juries end-
less rationalization in allowing recovery for the wrongful
death of a young child or infant.
(4) Suits for the wrongful death of a stillborn fetus would
promote fraudulent claims, result in a flood of litigation, and
involve conjecture and speculation.56 The fears of speculation,
conjecture and even fraudulent claims are not wholly un-
warranted, but such fears seem to be the result of a confusion
of evidentiary problems and the right of action.57 If the basic
proposition that the decedent was a person at the time of the
injury is accepted, the right of action could be enforced re-
gardless of the procedural and technical problems.58 It is an
unsound result to allow the difficulty of proof to destroy a
Il Id. at 124.
56 E.g., Magnolia Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Jordan, 124 Tex.
347, 78 S.W.2d 944, 950 (1935).
' Del Tufo, supra note 48, at 78.
58 Stidam v. Ashmore, 109 Ohio App. 431, 167 N.E.2d 106, 108
(1959).
19721
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legal right. Further, the evidentiary questions which would
arise in an action for the wrongful death of a stillborn fetus
would not be more difficult than evidentiary questions faced
in "thousands of other negligence cases."5 9
Why not allow the action, relegating to t h e evi-
dentiary process its normal function of establishing
causal sequence and screening out spurious claims?
To do otherwise is to emasculate the remedial powers
of tort law and to weaken the confidence of our so-
ciety in the ability of the courts to provide redress
for wrongful conduct.60
IV.
THE VIABILITY REQUIREMENT
A viable fetus is one which has reached that stage of
fetal development at which it may survive independent of its
mother and thus has the capacity to live even if she dies.01
Once fetal life is recognized as worthy of the protection of
the courts, the viability limitation becomes an invalid and
objectionable restriction, leading to "absurd" results.0 2
The viability issue served the courts by giving them add-
ed security in the early cases recognizing fetal existence and
traces its beginning in the field of prenatal injury to the dis-
sent of Justice Boggs in Allaire v. St. Luke's Hospital.0
If the evidentiary requirements were utilized properly,
the plaintiff's burden would automatically become greater
the more remote in point of time from full-term the injury
19 Woods v. Lancet, 303 N.Y. 349, 102 N.E.2d 691, 695 (1951).
00 Bowers, Wrongful Death Action, 1 GA. ST. B.J. 508, 516
(1965).
61 BLACK'S LAw DICTioNARY 1737 (rev. 4th ed. 1968).
62 Jasinsky v. Potts, 153 Ohio St. 529, 536, 92 N.E.2d 809, 812
(1950).
6 184 Ill. 359, 56 N.E. 638, 641 (1900).
[Vol. 8, No. I
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was inflicted, and there would be no arbitrary cut-off point
as in cases which adopt the viability requirement. 64
V.
STATUS OF THE STILLBORN FETUS IN OKLAHOMA
Oklahoma is aligned with the slight minority in holding
that there is no right of action which vests in the represen-
tative of the stillborn fetus. In Howell v. Rushing,5 a case of
first impression in Oklahoma, the Oklahoma Supreme Court
held there was no right of action for the wrongful death of
an infant en v.entre sa mere, and adopted the rule and rationale
of Drabbels v. Skelly Oil Co.68 In Drabbels, the Supreme Court
of Nebraska affirmed a judgment sustaining the defendant's
demurrer to the plaintiff's petition. The demurrer was couch-
ed in language urging that the decedent was dead when born
and, therefore, not an existing person within the contempla-
tion of the state wrongful death statute.6 7 The Drabbels court
stated the right of action created by the statute exists only
in cases wherein the injured "person" could have himself main-
tained an action for damages had he lived.6 8 Citing the then
numerical weight of authority for denying recovery for pre-
natally inflicted injuries in the event the child lived and the
rationale of Magnolia Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Jordan,6 9 the
court dismissed the plaintiff's contentions that the criminal
or civil law had a bearing on the law of torts and concluded
"an unborn child is a part of the mother until birth and, as
such, has no juridical existence."70 The court noted the great
64 "'Separate Existence' is not a necessary theoretic com-
ponent to recognizing a right in the infant." Del Tufo, supra
note 48, at 72.
65 261 P.2d 217 (Okla. 1953).
06 155 Neb. 17, 50 N.W.2d 229 (1951).
(7 NEB. REv. STAT. §30-809 (1943).
08 50 N.W.2d at 230.
60 124 Tex. 347, 78 S.W.2d 944 (1935).
70 50 N.W.2d at 232.
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advance in medical technology since the Dietrich case, but
stated such facts had no effect on the legal rights of the
child.71
The Drabbels case left the possibility of recovery for pre-
natal injuries by the surviving but injured infant in doubt,
but it is unlikely that the cause of action would have been
allowed had the question been before the court.72
The most recent Oklahoma Supreme Court decision re-
garding an action for the wrongful death of a stillborn fetus73
affirmed the Howell decision and held an Oklahoma statute
providing "a child conceived, but not born is to be deemed
an existing person so far as may be necessary for its interest
in the event of its subsequent birth"74 contemplated the sub-
sequent "live" birth of the child.75 The Oklahoma court con-
tinued its reliance on the Drabbels decision in distinguishing
the purpose of the criminal law,76 cited by plaintiffs, and the
law of torts.
The law relating to the possibility of recovery for pre-
natal injuries is not settled in Oklahoma since neither case
which considered a prenatal tort required the court to pass
directly on the question. Oklahoma may confine its statute77
providing for the interests of a child conceived and subse-
quently born to property concepts only. California did not
71 "[M]edical science may accelerate the birth of a viable
child and thereby accelerate the time it came into juridical
existence as a person independent of the mother." Id.
72 The opinion emphasized the numerical weight of authority
denying an action for prenatal injuries at common law.
50 N.W.2d at 230.
73 Padillow v. Elrod, 424 P.2d 16 (Okla. 1967).
74 OKLA. STAT. tit. 15, §15 (1961).
765 424 P.2d at 18.
76 OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, §§713, 714 (1961). (Prohibiting the kill-
ing of an unborn quick child and procuring the destruction
of an unborn child.).
77 OKLA. STAT. tit. 15, §15 (1961).
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so confine a nearly identical statute8 and allowed recovery
for prenatal injuries by a surviving but maimed infant in
1939.70 In this connection, California subsequently was called
on to consider the Scott v. McPheeters holding in conjunction
with the state wrongful death statute 0 which specifically re-
fers to minors. The court determined the wrongful death
statute, which is not derivative, contemplated three classes
of persons: minor persons, adult persons, and unborn per-
sons.81 The court, in effect, strictly construed the statute and
found only the death of adult persons or minor persons gave
rise to a cause of action.
Two Oklahoma decisions stand in the way of recovery
for the tortiously caused death of a fetus.8 2 Possibly, as law-
yers, who are traditionally adept at "weaving much law from
thin materials,"8' 3 become more concerned with the status
of the stillborn fetus, the case law in Oklahoma can be al-
tered before any further solidification takes place. Unless the
court limits Oklahoma's statutory enactments relating to
minors 84 strictly to property concepts, there is ample statutory
authority to avoid the distinctions in classes of persons de-
veloped in California.8 5 Oklahoma's wrongful death statute is
derivative,88 and minor persons are not mentioned as a class.
Additionally, all persons who are not minors by statute7 are
adults.8
78 CAL. CIV. CODE §29 (West 1954).
" Scott v. McPheeters, 33 Cal. App. 2d 629, 92 P.2d 678 (1939).
80 CAL. CIv. PRo. CODE §377 (West 1954).
81 Norman v. Murphy, 124 Cal. App. 2d 95, 268 P.2d 178 (1954).
82 Padillow v. Elrod, 424 P.2d 16 (Okla. 1967); Howell v. Rush-
ing, 261 P.2d 217 (Okla. 1953).
s3 Miller, supra note 22, at 288.
84 OKLA. STAT. tit. 15, §§13, 14 (1961).
8; Norman v. Murphy, 124 Cal. App. 2d 95, 268 P.2d 178 (1954).
86 ".... if the former [deceased] might have maintained an
action had he lived. . . ." OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, §1053 (1961).
87 Generally, males under 21 years and females under 18 years.
OKLA. STAT. tit. 15, §13 (1961).
88 "All other persons are adults." OKLA. STAT. tit. 15, §14
(1961).
1972]
16
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 8 [1972], Iss. 1, Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol8/iss1/5
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
Although Oklahoma has adopted the Drabbels0 view
that the criminal law does not affect tort law9" there is evi-
dence of a legislative intention in the criminal statutes9' to
protect the unborn fetus. The Constitution of Oklahoma pro-
vides that the "right of action" to recover damages for wrong-
ful death "shall never be abrogated."92 The state constitution
further provides "[a]ll persons have the inherent right to
life.... ,";93 "[t]he courts of justice of the State shall be open
to every person.. .; and right and justice shall be administer-
ed without sale, denial, delay, or prejudice."9 4 The Supreme
Court of Oklahoma has stated, "[f]rom the language of this
section of the Bill of Rights [art. 2, §6], it appears to us that
the framers of our Constitution clearly intended to open the
courts of justice to every person, no matter whom, for redress
of wrongs and for reparation for injuries."9 5 In addition to
the broad constitutional declaration of an "open door" policy
for the courts, the constitution further provides any provision
of a contract which attempts to waive any of the benefits
of the constitution "shall be null and void."96
It is respectfully submitted that there is ample authority
for the Supreme Court of Oklahoma "to act in the finest tra-
dition of the common law"07 in bringing the law of the state
into harmony with the current majority view which recognizes
a right of action under wrongful death statutes for the tor-
tiously caused death of a stillborn fetus.
89 155 Neb. 17, 50 N.W.2d 229 (1951).
10 424 P.2d at 18.
91 OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, §§713, 714 (1961).
92 OKLA. CoNsT. art. 23, §7.
"3 OKLA. CONST. art. 2, §2.
94 OKLA. CONST. art. 2, §6.
95 Fiedeer v. Fiedeer, 42 Okla. 124, 140 P. 1022, 1024 (1914).
96 OIMA. CONST. art. 23, §8.
97 Woods v. Lancet, 303 N.Y. 349, 102 N.E.2d 691 (1951).
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VI.
CONCLUSION
To attempt to reconcile the varied and conflicting de-
cisions regarding the existence of any right of recovery for
prenatal torts would be a futile endeavor.98 Any distinction
for the purposes of a wrongful death action, absent a clear
legislative expression to the contrary, between an infant born
injured and an infant stillborn would be the result of ab-
stract, mechanical, and technical reasoning. In effect it would
reward a wrongdoer who injured a fetus severely enough to
cause its immediate death. In recognizing the stillborn fetus
for the purposes of wrongful death statutes, the courts would
not be throwing the door wide-open to all claims regardless
of their merit. Through existing and traditionally recognized
evidentiary principles the courts could maintain proper scru-
tiny to avoid unjust results. Evidentiary considerations and
the right of action itself too often have been confused. The
law, particularly the law of torts, should be more than "prac-
tical;" 09 it should remain flexible and adaptable in the finest
common law tradition to serve the social and economic needs
of the community.
David 0. Denton
11 Stidam v. Ashmore, 109 Ohio App. 431, 167 N.E.2d 106, 107
(1959).
19 Drabbels v. Skelly Oil Co., 155 Neb. 17, 50 N.W.2d 229, 232
(1951).
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